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ABSTRACT
METHODS FOR FINDING THE SOURCES OF LEAKAGE IN
CACHE-TIMING ATTACKS AND REMOVING THE PROFILING
PHASE
ALI˙ CAN ATICI
Ph.D. Dissertation, December 2018
Supervisor: Prof. Erkay Savas¸
Keywords: Side-Channel Analysis, Leakage Sources, Hardware Performance Counters,
Cache-Timing Attacks, Cache Modeling, Profiling Phase
Cryptographic algorithms are widely used in daily life in order to ensure data confiden-
tiality and privacy. These algorithms are extensively analyzed by scientists against a the-
oretical deficiency. However, these theoretically verified algorithms could still posses
security risks if they are not cautiously implemented. Side-channel analysis can infer the
secret key by using the information leakage due to implementation flaws. One of the
most studied side-channel attack is the Bernstein’s cache-timing attack. This attack owes
its reputation to its ability to succeed without a spy process, which is needed to create
intentional cache contentions in other cache attacks. However, the exact leakage sources
of the Bernstein’s attack remained uncertain to a large extent. Moreover, the need for an
identical target system to perform its profiling phase makes the attack unrealistic for real
world computing platforms. In this dissertation we address these two problems. Firstly,
we propose a methodology to reveal the exact sources of the information leakage. The
iv
proposed methodology makes use of hardware performance counters to count the number
of cache misses, to which the code blocks in the program are subject. Our methodol-
ogy can help the developers analyze their implementations and fix their code in the early
phases of the development. Secondly, we present an approach to extract simplified cache
timing-behavior models analytically and propose to use these generated models instead of
a profiling phase. The fact that the attack can be accomplished without a profiling phase
will lead the attack to be considered a more realistic threat than the attack originally pro-
posed by Bernstein. We believe that, this improved version of the attack will encourage
the cryptographic system designers to take further precautions against the attack.
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O¨ZET
O¨NBELLEK-ZAMANLAMA SALDIRILARINDA SIZINTI
KAYNAKLARINI BULMAK VE AYRIMLAMA FAZINI
KALDIRMAK I˙C¸I˙N METOTLAR
ALI˙ CAN ATICI
Doktora Tezi, Aralık 2018
Danıs¸man: Prof. Dr. Erkay Savas¸
Anahtar So¨zcu¨kler: Yan-Kanal Analizi, Sızıntı Kaynakları, Donanım Performans
Sayac¸ları, O¨nbellek-Zamanlama Saldırıları, O¨nbellek Modelleme, Ayrımlama Fazı
Kriptografik algoritmalar gu¨nlu¨k hayatımızda yaygın olarak kullanılmaktadır. Bu algorit-
malar, olası ac¸ıklara kars¸ı, biliminsanlari tarafından matematiksel olarak analiz edilmek-
tedir. Bu algoritmalar matematiksel olarak dog˘rulanmıs¸ olmalarına rag˘men, o¨zenli bir
s¸ekilde gerc¸eklenmezlerse, gu¨venlik riskleri barındırmaya devam edebilirler. Yan-kanal
analizi ile gerc¸ekleme hatalarından kaynaklı bilgi sızıntıları kullanılarak gizli anahtar elde
edilebilmektedir. En c¸ok c¸alıs¸ılmıs¸ yan-kanal ataklarından birisi Bernstein’ın atag˘ıdır.
Bu atak, bas¸arılı sonuc¸lar elde etmek ic¸in kasıtlı olarak o¨nbellek c¸akıs¸maları yaratan
bir casus su¨rece ihtiyac¸ duymaması ile bilinmektedir. Bununla birlikte, atag˘ı bas¸arıya
ulas¸tıran sızıntı kaynakları net bir s¸ekilde ortaya c¸ıkarılamamıs¸tır. Ayrıca ayrımlama fazı
ic¸in, hedef sistemin bire bir kopyasına ihtiyac¸ duyması atag˘ın gerc¸ek hayattaki uygulan-
abilirlig˘i u¨zerinde soru is¸aretleri uyandırmıs¸tır. Bu tezde, bu iki sorun u¨zerinde c¸alıs¸malar
vi
yapılmıs¸tır. I˙lk olarak, bilgi sızıntısının kesin kaynag˘ını bulmak ic¸in bir metodoloji o¨neri-
yoruz. O¨nerilen metodoloji, program ic¸erisindeki kod bloklarının maruz kaldıg˘ı o¨nbellek
ıskalarını, donanım performans sayac¸ları ile saymaya dayanmaktadır. Program gelis¸-
tiricileri, metodolojimizi kullanarak kodlarını analiz edebilir ve olası hataları erken bir
as¸amada du¨zeltebilirler. I˙kinci olarak, o¨nbellek zaman-davranıs¸ı modellerini analitik o-
larak c¸ıkarmaya yarayan bir yaklas¸ım sunuyor ve olus¸turulan bu modelleri ayrımlama
fazı yerine kullanmayı o¨neriyoruz. Saldırının bir ayrımlama as¸aması olmadan gerc¸ek-
les¸tirilebilmesinin, saldırının daha gerc¸ekc¸i bir tehdit olarak go¨ru¨lmesini sag˘layacag˘ını
ve kriptografik sistem tasarımcılarını, atag˘a kars¸ı ek o¨nlemler almaya tes¸vik edeceg˘ini
du¨s¸u¨nu¨yoruz.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Cryptography, the art of protecting secrets, has been being used for centuries. Even
though it might be considered as an art in its early ages, it has been being studied as a
science for more than half a century. Thus, the science of cryptography has advanced
tremendously since the era of simple ciphers. Now, the modern cryptography, rises upon
complex mathematical foundations.
The desire to conceal secrets from other people has led to the rise of a counter-desire:
breaking the secret messages. Thus, in modern cryptographic studies, the cryptographic
algorithm design and the cryptanalysis (i.e. breaking the ciphers) have developed in con-
stant interaction with each other. New encryption techniques have stimulated the efforts to
find new cryptoanalytical methods to break the ciphers and obtain the secret messages; the
new cryptanalytical methods are, in turn, considered to design new algorithms that with-
stand them. In the early times of cryptanalysis, researchers were relying exclusively on
the mathematical analysis of cryptographic algorithms in order to find theoretical weak-
nesses to break the ciphers. However, in 1996 Kocher [1] introduced a new type of attack,
which uses the timing measurements taken during the execution of the private key op-
erations on a real hardware. His attack leveraged an implementation flaw instead of a
theoretical weakness of the underlying mathematical algorithm. And he was able to break
the cipher. With his study, Kocher introduced a new field in cryptanalysis: side-channel
analysis (or side-channel attacks).
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Cryptographic algorithms that are secure against known theoretical attacks can still
be vulnerable to side-channel analysis if they are not cautiously implemented. Execution
time, power consumption, electromagnetic emission, execution footprints in the micro-
architectural structure of underlying microprocessor, etc. can be used as side-channel
information [1–4]. In unprotected cryptographic implementations, the secret key directly
affects the emitted side-channel information. Thus, observations made on these leaked
data can eventually lead to the revelation of the secret key.
1.1 Motivation
Side-channel attacks, which exploit the fact that micro-architectural resources, such as
cache memory and branch prediction unit, are shared, are widely studied in the litera-
ture [4–7]. The cache access patterns of cryptographic programs are exploited by the
cache-based side-channel attacks. These attacks typically operate by inferring if a cache
access is a hit or a miss, or if a certain cache line is accessed or not, mostly by measuring
the access time. If the inference is accurate, the access patterns can be associated with
im/probable key guesses to infer the secret key or to reduce the size of the key space.
The majority of the cache attacks rely on the so-called cache cleaning operation exe-
cuted by a spy process, which can be detected easily [8] that evicts all or a part of data of
cryptographic process from the cache before the start of an encryption operation. Bern-
stein’s attack [9], which can be categorized as a timing-based attack is the only exception.
Bernstein’s attack is applied in a client-server setting. The attack tries to infer the secret
key, which resides in a server that employs a software implementation of the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [10] to encrypt incoming messages, by using the variations
in the encryption times of randomly generated messages.
The attack consists of two main phases. In the first phase, known as the profiling
phase, which is run on an identical platform to the target with a known key, a statistical
model is extracted depending on the timing variations of the encryptions. The second
(attack) phase extracts a similar model on the target machine, where the secret key is
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unknown, and correlates these two obtained models to make inferences about the secret
key, i.e. reduces the key space for a feasible exhaustive search. In his experiments,
Bernstein runs the attack on an AES server locally and reduces the key space considerably
after measuring the execution times for 230 sample plaintexts. In [11], Neve explains the
reasons that lead the Bernstein’s attack to success. The most interesting point in the
attack is that it does not need a spy process. An intrinsic flaw in the implementation of
AES server naturally causes cache contentions (i.e. eviction of the cache lines used by the
AES server), which in turn makes the attack possible.
Bernstein’s original attack is very interesting and needs for further study to understand
its main cause and remedy the implementation accordingly. Bernstein’s attack is powerful
because it does not count on any spy process; yet it is also weak as it needs an identical
target machine to perform its profiling phase. It is powerful, but the sources of the internal
leakage is neither understood nor investigated well, which may pose a risk for the similar
systems that can have the same leakage sources. It is weak, since obtaining an exact
replication of the target system and emulating all its machine specific cache effects can be
very difficult if not impossible. This dissertation aims to investigate and produce solutions
on these two open areas: i.e. (i) to devise a methodology to find the internal leakage
sources, (ii) to remove the profiling phase to make the attack more realistic.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis presents two novel solutions which address the open areas of the Bernstein’s
cache-timing attack. The first solution presents a methodology to find the code blocks
that are in contention with each other by using Hardware Performance Counters (HPC).
And the second solution proposes a new methodology to model the cache timing-behavior
of an application, where the inferred cache timing-behavior model is used to remove the
profiling phase of the Bernstein’s cache-timing attack.
The major contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
• We propose to use the HPCs in order to count the L1 data cache misses and to
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use this information the detect which code blocks are in contention with each other
(Section 4.1).
• We demonstrate by experiments that the proposed methodology is able to find the
colliding code blocks (Section 4.2.2).
• We propose a methodology to model the cache timing-behavior of an application.
The proposed method does not need to know all the architectural properties of the
underlying system. Only the cache line size is enough to extract the proposed model
(Section 5.2).
• We utilize the proposed cache timing-behavior model to remove the profiling phase
of the Bernstein’s attack, which makes the attack more realistic for the real comput-
ing platforms (Section 5.3.1).
• We validate the proposed model by conducting Bernstein’s cache-timing attack suc-
cessfully without a profiling phase (Section 5.3.2).
1.3 Outline
The organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 presents the related work on cache-
timing attacks; Chapter 3 provides the background information on AES, Bernstein’s at-
tack, a variation of Bernstein’s attack on the last round of AES, CPU caches and HPCs;
Chapter 4 outlines our methodology to find the colliding code blocks of a program that
cause leakage and presents the experimental results; Chapter 5 explains how we extracted
a cache timing-behavior model from the cache line size, how this model is used to remove
the profiling phase of the Bernstein’s attack and presents the validation results; Chapter 6
concludes the thesis.
4
Chapter 2
RELATEDWORK
In the literature there are many works that use the shared micro-architectural resources
as side-channels. In [4, 12] Aciicmez et al. leverage the branch prediction unit to infer
the secret keys. Again, Aciicmez et al. show that the instruction cache can also be used
as a side-channel to obtain the secret keys [13–15]. Side-channel attacks which exploit
the data caches are also widely studied in the literature [5, 9, 16–24]. In this thesis we
focus on the data cache based side-channel attacks. The first notions on data cache based
side-channel attacks are reported in [1] and [25]. In [1], Kocher states that cryptographic
applications may take different times for varying inputs. He also explains that the reasons
behind these variations include cache hits, performance optimizations etc. He performs a
timing attack against private key operations and remarks that the tables used in the imple-
mentations of algorithms such as Blowfish [26], SEAL [27] and DES [28] can produce
timing variations due to cache hits and misses. Kelsey et al. [25] propose a timing attack
against IDEA [29] and state that ciphers such as Blowfish [26] and CAST [30] can be
vulnerable to cache attacks due to their large S-boxes.
Cache-based side-channel attacks can be divided into three main categories: i) access-
driven, ii) trace-driven and iii) time-driven cache attacks. Access-driven attacks exploit
the information as to whether a cache line (or set) is accessed (or not) during a cryp-
tographic operation to infer the secret key. In an access-driven attack, the adversary is
generally assumed to be able to run a so-called spy process to generate intentional cache
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conflicts with the cryptographic application to obtain the cache access patterns of the lat-
ter. In their proposed approach [16], Tromer et al. employ a spy process to determine
the cache lines/sets that are used by a cryptographic application in a known plaintext
and/or ciphertext setup. In the attack Tromer et al. describe two cases: synchronous and
asynchronous. In the synchronous case, the attacker is capable of starting an encryption
operation at will and he has two different measurement methodologies to detect the col-
liding cache lines: Evict+Time and Prime+Probe. By using Evict+Time, the attacker first
starts an encryption operation, then accesses to some specific memory addresses (i.e. AES
table addresses) to cause evictions and finally starts another encryption and measures the
execution time. Here the first encryption brings the AES tables into the cache, the mem-
ory access in the second step causes evictions if the same cache lines are used by the two
processes and the final step extracts which cache lines are accessed since the execution
time is directly effected by the cache hits and misses. The Prime+Probe method works
in a different way. The attacker first accesses to every memory location of the AES tables
to bring them into the cache. Then he triggers an encryption and afterwards he performs
another memory access. Again by measuring its memory access times he deduces which
cache lines are accessed by the cryptographic process. In the synchronous attack, they
show that the full AES key is recoverable after 300 encryptions on a Athlon 64 system by
Prime+Probemeasurements. The asynchronous attack has extra limitations, such that the
spy process is not allowed to interact with the target process. Thus, the attacker will not be
able to trigger an encryption. The attack is conducted only with the memory access pat-
terns of the spy process. The attacker accesses to a set of memory blocks repeatedly and
measures the access times. If the spy process conflicts with the target process, memory
access will be longer than usual. This timing information is used to detect the conflicting
cache lines and to conduct the attack. In the asynchronous case, one minute of monitoring
of encryption operations with the same secret key reveals 45.7 bits of the AES key.
Trace-driven cache attacks (i.e., the second category of attacks) were, on the other
hand, first introduced in [5]. In these attacks, it is assumed that the adversary has full
control over the target device and that she can determine whether a particular cache access
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is a miss or hit during the cryptographic operation by monitoring electro-magnetic or
power emissions of the cryptographic device. Thus, theoretically the attacker will obtain
a trace of cache access outcomes during the cryptographic operation. In a simulation
of the attack reported in [5], 210 encryptions are performed to collect traces and then an
offline analysis phase is run with a computational complexity of around 232 steps. As
a result, it was shown that a 56-bit DES key actually provides only 32-bit key security
if the attack is successfully applied. Trace-driven attacks are also investigated in detail
in [20, 31, 32].
In the last category of cache attacks, time-driven attacks measure the execution time of
a cryptographic operation and exploit the timing variations in different runs with different
plaintexts. The assumption is that the execution time of the operation is heavily affected
by the memory access times due to cache misses. Thus, the variations in different runs of
the cryptographic operation occur because of different number of cache hits and misses
that are dependent on the secret keys and the plaintext. This dependency can be exploited
to extract the secret key. In [18] Tsunoo et al. use the time variations that occur during
encryptions due to the cache misses as a result of s-box table lookup operations. They
propose two methods to infer the secret key: non-elimination table attack and elimination
table attack. In the non-elimination attack, by using the shorter encryption timings the
probable key guesses are extracted and a search for the secret key is executed. However,
in the elimination attack, they use the longer encryption timings to guess the improbable
keys and they reduce the size of the key space to search. When they apply the elimination
table attack approach on DES algorithm, they show that the algorithm is broken after 223
known plaintexts. They also state a success rate greater than 90% after 224 operations.
Bernstein’s attack, which is the main focus of this thesis, is also a time-driven at-
tack. Neve gives an explanation as to why Bernstein’s attack works [11]. Neve examines
the behavior of the cache accesses during the AES encryption process and observes that
variations in AES execution times are due to deterministic and naturally occurring sys-
tem dependent cache evictions. However, Neve does not identify the exact root cause
creating these cache contentions. In this thesis, we take one step further and propose a
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methodology to discover which process(es) or code segments cause these deterministic
and system dependent cache evictions [33]. Bernstein’s attack is a profiled timing attack.
In the literature there are works that aim to improve the profiling phase and chose the best
attack strategy by mathematical analysis [34]. But, to the best of our knowledge, there
are no studies that try to execute the profiling phase analytically without performing any
physical measurements. As a part of this thesis, we present a methodology to extract the
profiling phase model analytically and propose conducting Bernstein’s attack with these
analytically extracted models [35].
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Chapter 3
PRELIMINARIES
In this chapter, we provide the necessary background information about the basic proper-
ties of CPU caches and hardware performance counters, the details of the AES algorithm
and its table based implementation, how the original Bernstein attack is conducted and,
how we modified the Bernstein attack for the last round of the AES algorithm.
3.1 CPU Caches
In today’s modern processors, the memory system itself is a hierarchy of memories, where
each level in the hierarchy has different speeds of access times. The memory hierarchy is
mainly comprised of registers, several levels of cache, main memory and secondary mem-
ory. The memory access times of these different levels are summarized in Table 3.1 [36].
Table 3.1: Memory hierarchy access times
Memory level Access time
Register 0.3ns - 2ns
Level 1 cache 3ns - 8ns
Level 2 cache 6ns - 10ns
Main memory 10ns - 70ns
Fixed rigid disk 3ms - 15ms
As seen from the Table 3.1, the closer the memory to the processor, the faster it is.
Faster memory means more advanced technology, thus being more costly. Because of the
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cost, the size of the memory gets smaller, as it comes closer to the processor.
In this memory hierarchy, cache is a fast and small memory, which stores the data that
the processor uses and will probably use again in the near future. Figure 3.1 shows an
example of memory hierarchy which has two levels of cache [37]. A data item requested
by the CPU is searched first in the topmost (level 1) and also the fastest cache level; and
in case it is not found therein, the next level in the hierarchy is tried. If the data is found in
a cache level, it is a cache hit for this level of the cache hierarchy. Any data item missing
in a level leads to a cache miss which in turn results in a delay in the access time as the
next levels need to be accessed.
Figure 3.1: An example of a memory system
Processors tend to execute the codes sequentially, which means after executing in-
struction x, most probably instruction x+ 1 will be executed. The same rationale is valid
also for the data. In a typical program flow, data is accessed sequentially most of the time
(e.g. arrays). Also, in a program, same variables are used again and again. This situation
is called as principle of locality and can be examined under three categories:
• Temporal locality: Used variables tend to be used again.
• Spatial locality: Data is accessed sequentially as in arrays.
• Sequential locality: Most of the time instructions are fetched sequentially.
Thus, according to the spatial locality, if we fetch a piece of data from memory, most
likely the processor will also need the data which is adjacent to the formerly fetched data.
So, when a miss occurs in the cache, not only the missing data is fetched, an entire block
which contains the missing data is fetched to the cache. The fetched block is accommo-
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dated in a cache line. A cache line size is usually a multiple of the CPU word length and
therefore it is dependent on the architecture of the underlying platform. A typical cache
line size in modern computers is 64 B.
A typical cache consists of sets, where each set contains one or more cache lines.
The method of placing a data in the memory to a cache location is called mapping [38].
Mapping is done according to some specific address bits and each address maps to a
single set. We can name three groups of caches: (i) direct mapped cache, (ii) N-way set
associative cache, (i) fully associative cache.
In a direct mapped cache, each set contains one cache line. Figure 3.2 shows which
fields of the address is used to map the cache location.
Figure 3.2: Cache fields for a direct mapped cache
The cache fields in Figure 3.2 belong to a 32-bit processor, which has an 8-set direct
mapped cache, where each cache line is one word. The least significant two bits deter-
mine the byte offset in the relevant word. The following three bits are used to select the
cache line that will accommodate the main memory data. Since different addresses map
to a single cache line, the actual data address must be also kept. Thus, the remaining
significant bits are also stored in the cache as tag to indicate the real address of the data in
the cache line. Figure 3.3 depicts the basic architecture of an 8-set direct mapped cache.
Figure 3.3: Basic direct mapped cache architecture
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If any two physical addresses map to the same cache location, a cache conflict occurs
and the data currently resides in the cache is evicted. In the case of direct mapped caches,
since there is only one cache line in a set, two addresses that map to the same cache set
always cause a conflict. Figure 3.4 shows an example of how the physical addresses are
mapped to a direct cache.
Figure 3.4: Direct mapped cache address mapping example
However, the situation is different in N-way set associative caches. In this cache archi-
tecture each set has N cache lines and an address that maps to a set can be accommodated
in any one of these cache lines. Hence, this architecture reduces the number of cache
misses. Similarly, a fully associative cache is a B-way associative cache, where B is the
number of total cache lines in the cache. Further information about the cache architectures
and operating principles can be found in [36–38].
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3.2 Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs)
Hardware performance counters are hardware-resident counters that record various events
occurring on a processor. Today’s general-purpose CPUs include a fair number of such
counters, which are capable of recording events, such as the number of instructions exe-
cuted, the number of branches taken, the number of cache hits and misses experienced,
etc [39, 40].
Hardware performance counters are mainly used for software profiling. Engineers
use them to improve the performance of their software. The actual hardware performance
counter numbers in a CPU varies among the vendors and varies even in the different mod-
els by the same vendor. For example, Intel CPU families support a set of architectural
and non-architectural performance events [39]. Non-architectural events are model spe-
cific and not compatible among the CPU families. However, architectural events are same
among the CPU families and they provide a uniformity in different classes of CPUs. The
required information about the hardware performance counters of a specific processor can
easily be found among the documentation of the relevant CPU.
Even though not all the HPCs are same, their working principle is similar. Hardware
performance counters are by default inactivated. To activate them, a code indicating the
type of event to be counted and the physical counter to be used for counting is written to
a register and then the CPU is instructed to start the counting process. There are often
a number of physical counters present in a CPU and these counters can individually be
paired with any event known to the CPU. Once activated, hardware counters count the
events of interest during program executions and store the counts in a set of special pur-
pose registers. These registers can then be programmatically read and reset, and hardware
counters can be deactivated as needed. In most cases, kernel must be patched to access
these counters and privileged user rights are required to program the performance counter
control registers. However, there are many libraries such as PAPI [41] that provide a
simple interface to program and read the performance counters.
Hardware performance counters have been traditionally used (i) for performance de-
bugging to identify hotspots in the program code [42], (ii) for functional correctness de-
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bugging, where they serve as an abstraction mechanism [43–45], and (iii) for carrying out
side channel attacks [24]. This work differs in that we use hardware performance counters
to identify the sources of cache contentions, as well.
3.3 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
AES [10] is a symmetric-key block cipher algorithm. AES is announced by the U.S.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as FIPS PUB 197 in 2001. The
original algorithm, which was submitted to the AES competition, is called Rijndael. The
AES standard is a variant of the Rijndael algorithm which has a fixed block length of 128
bits. To provide different security levels, AES can work with key sizes of 128, 192 or 256
bits. It accepts plaintext inputs as blocks of 128 bits and outputs 128 bits ciphertexts for
each input block.
AES operates on a 4×4 matrix of bytes which is called as the state. Before beginning
of the encryption or decryption, the input is copied to the state matrix, computations are
performed on this state matrix and in the end, the result is copied to the output array. This
process is depicted in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: AES input, state and output transition
AES computations are done in rounds. The number of rounds depends on the key
size. AES has 10, 12 and 14 rounds for the key sizes 128, 192 and 256, respectively.
Every round uses a different 128-bit round key which is generated from the master key
according to the AES key expansion algorithm.
AES starts encryption with an initial AddRoundKey operation and each following
round consists of the SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey
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operations in the given order. However, the last round of the AES does not involve the
MixColumns operation. AES performs decryption by computing the inverse operations
in the reversed order (note that all round operations in AES algorithm are reversible).
AES rounds are shown in Figure 3.6. In the figure Nr denotes the number of rounds.
Figure 3.6: AES rounds
AddRoundKey operation performs bitwise XOR between the bytes of the state and
the bytes of the round key. SubBytes provides a non-linear substitution of the state
bytes. Each byte of the state is replaced with another byte according to a nonlinear trans-
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formation that is derived from the Rijndael S-Box. SubBytes operation is depicted in
Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: AES SubBytes operation
ShiftRows operation cyclic left shifts each row by a predefined offset. Row num-
ber 0 is not shifted, row number 1 is shifted once, row number 2 is shifted twice and
row number 3 is shifted three times. Figure 3.8 shows how the state changes after the
ShiftRows operation.
Figure 3.8: AES ShiftRows operation
MixColumns performs a linear transformation on the columns of the state. Each
column of the state constitutes a polynomial overGF (28) and a modular polynomial mul-
tiplication is executed between each column and the fixed polynomial a(x) = {03}x3 +
{01}x2+{01}x+{02} in modulo x4+1. Figure 3.9 shows the MixColumns operation.
The straightforward AES implementations perform all the round computations se-
quentially. However, AES can be implemented faster on platforms which have a 32-bit
or larger word size. Instead of calculating each round operation separately, SubBytes,
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Figure 3.9: AES MixColumns operation
ShiftRows and MixColumns operations can be combined in a lookup table, which is
named as AES T-table. In such an implementation, except for the last round, four tables
(T0, T1, T2, T3) are needed where each table has 256 entries of 32-bit entry size. Thus,
each table requires 1024 bytes and in total four tables require 4 KB in the memory. Since
the last round does not perform MixColums operation another table (T4) is needed.
One table with 256 entries of 32-bit entry size suffices to implement the last round. With
this implementation, one round can be computed by 16 table lookups and 12 32-bit XOR
operations, followed by the four 32-bit XOR operations of the AddRoundKey step. Fig-
ure 3.10 depicts how next state si+1 is computed from current state si and T-tables. The
only difference in the last round is the usage of T4 table instead of T0, T1, T2 and T3.
Figure 3.10: Table-based AES implementation
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3.4 Bernstein’s Cache-Timing Attack
Bernstein presents a cache based timing attack, which targets the lookup table based
OpenSSL implementation of AES [9]. In his attack, he aims the first AddRoundKey
operation of the AES encryption. He exploits the timing differences of the AES execution
times that are caused by the T-table accesses. He claims that the T-table lookup indexes
k[j] ⊕ p[j], where j = 0, 1, . . . , 15, k denotes the first round key bytes and p denotes the
plaintext bytes, affect the table access time and this time is highly correlated with the AES
execution time.
In his attack he defines two different roles: an AES server which is the victim of the
attack, and an AES client, which is the adversary applying the attack. The AES server
waits for the incoming encryption requests from the network. When a request is received,
it encrypts the message and sends back the ciphertext. The AES client sends randomly
generated messages to the server and gets the corresponding ciphertext and the elapsed
timing. After gathering sufficient number of timing measurements, the client performs
a statistical computation and obtains the secret key. The attack consists of four phases:
profiling, attack, correlation and key search.
In the profiling phase, the attacker uses an AES server, which is identical to the target
server, to encrypt a large number of randomly generated plaintexts with a known key. In
the first round of AES, the indexes to the lookup tables are computed as s0i = pi ⊕ k
0
i ,
where pi and k
0
i are ith bytes of the plaintext and the first round key, respectively, and
i = 0, 1, . . . , 15. The attacker obtains the execution time of each encryption and saves it
along with the indexes. The attacker stores the average timing information for each byte
and each value of that byte in a two dimensional array t[16][256]. The attacker also keeps
track of the overall average execution time. At the end of the profiling phase, the attacker
computes a model for each byte. This model basically shows the timing difference of
the average individual byte execution time from the overall average execution time. Fig-
ure 3.11 shows such a model. In the figure, x-axis shows all the possible values from 0
to 255 that a byte can take and y-axis gives the timing difference according to the overall
mean execution time. At the end of the profiling phase, a total of sixteen models, one for
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each byte, are constructed.
Figure 3.11: Example byte model obtained after the profiling phase
In the attack phase, the same operation is repeated, but this time on the target AES
server using an unknown key. In the attack phase, the key is not known therefore, for each
access in the first round, the timing profiles are constructed according to the plaintext
values p′i instead of lookup table indexes s
0′
i = p
′
i ⊕ k
0′
i . Again, the attacker obtains
the execution time of each encryption and saves it along with the indexes (i.e. this time
plaintext byte values). The attacker stores the average timing information for each byte
and each value of that byte in another two dimensional array t′[16][256]. The model
obtained after the attack step is shown in Figure 3.12.
Figure 3.12 belongs to the same byte model as in Figure 3.11. As can be seen from
the figure, since the secret key is not known, it looks like a scrambled model and does not
provide any useful information.
Correlation phase is executed after the attack phase. In this phase, for each model
found in the attack phase all possible key byte values are tried and a timing profile of
indexes (s0
′
i = p
′
i ⊕ k
0
i ) are obtained for each key candidate where i = 0, 1, . . . , 15 and
ki = 0, 1, . . . , 255. Then, each of the timing models in the attack phase is correlated
with the timing model obtained in the profiling phase. The key byte candidates are sorted
in a decreasing order according to their correlation scores. Also a selection threshold is
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Figure 3.12: Example byte model obtained after the attack phase
applied on the correlation results of the key byte candidates. Hence, only the most prob-
able key candidates appear on the results. In summary, correlation phase tries to find the
model which is the closest to the profiling phase model by trying all the possible byte
values. Figure 3.13 shows the model, which belongs to byte 15, that gives the highest cor-
relation for the attack phase byte model depicted in Figure 3.12. One can easily notice the
resemblance between Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.13 which is consistent with the obtained
high correlation value.
Figure 3.13: Example byte model obtained after the correlation phase
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Table 3.2 also gives the correlation results for the example data used in Figures 3.11
and 3.12, where the secret key is: {ce fb 74 0a a9 55 d3 1d ed 29 81 4c 25 72 5b 93}. In
Table 3.2 first column denotes the number of possible values, second column denotes the
byte number of the key and the last column denotes the possible values for that key byte
in the descending order.
Table 3.2: Correlation phase results for the example data set
240 00 f8 ff fa f9 fc fd fb fe e3 e7 e2 e1 e0 e6 e4 81 ... (ce at rank 66)
255 01 bc bd bb b8 ba a5 bf a2 a7 be a6 e0 e3 a0 b9 e5 ... (fb at rank 57)
016 02 37 32 31 34 35 36 33 30 2c 2f 2d 2b 2e 29 28 2a (missing 74)
016 03 0e 0b 0f 09 0a 0c 08 0d 13 12 17 14 10 11 15 16
016 04 b6 b0 b3 b7 b5 b2 b1 a9 af aa ac b4 a8 ae ab ad
096 05 4e 4d 51 48 4a 4c 53 49 4b 56 55 4f 54 50 57 52 ...
001 06 d3
016 07 1c 1d 1a 19 1f 18 1b 1e 07 00 04 06 03 01 02 05
119 08 ee eb ed ec e8 e9 ea ef f5 f0 f3 f6 f2 f1 f7 f4 ...
256 09 34 32 37 36 33 7d 31 0f 63 35 7a 30 66 78 65 0d ... (29 at rank 50)
008 10 81 87 83 84 86 82 80 85
017 11 4e 4c 4b 49 4d 4a 48 4f 50 56 57 51 54 53 52 55 ...
080 12 26 23 21 24 27 20 22 25 3f 3e 3c 3d 39 38 3b 3a ...
110 13 73 71 77 75 70 72 76 74 33 37 31 34 35 32 36 30 ...
001 14 5b
008 15 96 93 94 92 91 90 97 95
Finally, the key search phase simply performs a brute force key search on the remain-
ing key space, using a known plaintext and ciphertext pair.
In Bernstein’s attack, the profiling phase tries to model the cache timing-behavior of
the target system. The attack needs no spy process to artificially evict cache lines holding
lookup table entries, but rather relies on naturally occurring evictions, if any. Also, no
specific knowledge about the target system is required, since the attack needs nothing
other than the timing information. Thus, Bernstein’s attack is generic and can be applied
to all similar systems. For more information about the attack, the interested reader can
profitably refer to [9, 11].
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3.5 Applying Bernstein’s Cache-Timing Attack to the Last
Round of AES
Bernstein’s original attack can recover at most half of the 128-bit AES key (when 64 B
cache blocks are used) since only the upper nibble of each key byte is used to determine
the cache set that holds the corresponding entry. Neve [11] demonstrated that the other
half of the secret key can be obtained if the Bernstein’s attack is combined with a similar
attack targeting the second round. However, the version of the AES algorithm used in both
works [9,11] (OpenSSL v0.9.7a) allows an easier attack on the last round of AES that has
the potential of recovering the entire key. Similar to the original Bernstein attack, the AES
client (i.e. adversary) performs the profiling, attack, correlation and key search phases by
aiming the last round table lookup operations. This new improved attack allowed us to
recover 128-bits of the key in some cases.
The profiling phase is executed with a known key, similarly as in the original attack
case. AES client sends randomly chosen plaintexts and receives the resulting ciphertext
and the timing measurement data. During the last round of the AES [10], a separate table,
namely T4, which basically implements the AES SubBytes operation in the last round,
is used. The number of cache hits and misses that occur during the accesses to this table
affect the overall execution time of the encryption. The outputs of T4 lookup operations
(i.e., T4[s9i ] where s
9
i is the lookup index of round 10 and i = 0, 1, . . . , 15) are used as
indexes to obtain the aforementioned statistical byte models. In the profiling phase, the
outputs of T4 lookups used in the last round can be computed using the formula
InvShiftRows(ci ⊕ k
10
i ), (3.1)
where ci and k
10
i stand for the i
th bytes of the ciphertext and the 10th round key, respec-
tively, and i = 0, 1, . . . , 15. As both the key and the ciphertext are known in the profiling
phase, we can obtain a timing profile based on the output values of T4 lookup operations.
As a result, we obtain a total of 16 timing profiles for T4 lookup operations in the last
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round, in each of which 256 average execution times of AES are stored. Namely, timing
profiles can be represented as an array of T pi [256]where i is the order of the T4 access and
i = 0, 1, . . . , 15. An example byte model obtained after this phase is given in Figure 3.14.
Figure 3.14: Example T4 output byte model obtained after the profiling phase
After the profiling phase, the attack phase is executed similarly. In this phase, the se-
cret round key byte k˜10i is unknown, hence we obtain one timing profile for each candidate
of the corresponding key byte using the following equation
InvShiftRows(c′i), (3.2)
where c′i stands for the i
th bytes of the ciphertext. Thus, at the end of attack phase we
obtain a timing profile, namely the array T˜ ai [256]. Figure 3.15 shows an example byte
model of an attack phase data.
In the correlation phase, for each T4 output byte model, all possible timing pro-
files, namely T ai,k[256], are constructed by using InvShiftRows(c
′
i ⊕ k), where k =
0, 1, . . . , 255. Then, the timing profiles in the attack phase T ai,k are correlated to the tim-
ing model of the profiling phase T pi . The key value k yielding the highest correlation is
chosen as the most likely candidate for the key byte k˜10i . The operation is repeated 16
times for each byte of the round key used in the last round, i.e., k˜100 , . . ., k˜
10
15 . Figure 3.16
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Figure 3.15: Example T4 output byte model obtained after the attack phase
shows the model, which belongs to byte 1, that gives the highest correlation for the attack
phase byte model depicted in Figure 3.15.
Figure 3.16: Example T4 output byte model obtained after the correlation phase
After the correlation phase, a brute force key search is applied to fully recover the
key. Table 3.3 presents the correlation results for the example data used in Figures 3.14
and 3.15, where the secret key is: {2b 7e 15 16 28 ae d2 a6 ab f7 15 88 09 cf 4f 3c}
and the last round key is: {d0 14 f9 a8 c9 ee 25 89 e1 3f 0c c8 b6 63 0c a6}. Again, in
Table 3.3 first column denotes the number of possible values, second column denotes the
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byte number of the key and the last column denotes the possible values for that key byte
in the descending order.
Table 3.3: Last round attack correlation phase results for the example data set
001 00 d0
001 01 14
001 02 f9
001 03 a8
001 04 c9
001 05 ee
001 06 25
001 07 89
001 08 e1
001 09 3f
001 10 0c
001 11 c8
256 12 71 70 36 2e 33 cb 62 fc 60 ea ... (b6 at rank 251)
256 13 04 59 a5 2f ef a3 63 ...
256 14 ea 23 25 16 67 77 ae 67 8d 33 14 dc 0c ...
256 15 fb 84 f3 78 cc 3f 01 5b 82 a6 ...
An important point to note here is that, since timing profiles are extracted according
to the T4 outputs and every bit of the 10th round key is used to infer the T4 outputs (i.e.
every bit affects the relevant byte model), the last round attack can reveal the entire key
as opposed to the half of the key in the first round attack.
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Chapter 4
ISOLATING the LEAKAGE
SOURCES in CACHE-TIMING
ATTACKS
Bernstein [9], exploits the differences between the encryption times of randomly gener-
ated messages to extract secret keys processed by an OpenSSL implementation of AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard [10]). Neve [11] demonstrates that the exploitable timing
differences in the Bernstein’s attack occur due to some conflicting L1 data cache accesses
with the AES cache accesses, causing some table entries used by AES to be evicted from
the cache, e.g., messages that experience cache misses take longer to encrypt than those
messages that don’t experience any cache misses.
An important observation we make in the Bernstein’s attack is that, unlike many other
side channel attacks, in which the attack is performed by using a spy process that in-
tentionally creates cache contentions, the Bernstein’s attack operates without using any
spy processes. This observation strongly suggests that the cache contentions exploited
in the Bernstein’s attack are unintentionally caused by some entities in the cryptographic
system. We value this observation, because such inadvertent contentions should be con-
sidered as a flaw in the implementation of cryptographic systems. This, consequently,
necessitates a software analysis framework to identify the primary sources of these con-
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tentions and check the effectiveness of proposed countermeasures, to further improve the
reliability of cryptographic applications.
In this chapter, we present an approach to identify code segments in cryptographic
applications that are unintentionally in cache contentions with each other, thus leaking
information that can be exploited in side-channel attacks to extract secret keys. This is
important because locating the sources of information leakage in software implementation
of cryptographic applications provides developers an invaluable opportunity to fix them,
thus prevent side-channel attacks. An integral part of the proposed approach is to quantify
the contentions in cache memory. For that we use hardware performance counters to count
the number of misses occurring in cache memory. We furthermore evaluate our approach
by conducting a series of experiments on the well-known Bernstein’s attack. The results
of these experiments demonstrate, (to the best of our knowledge) for the first time, that
the part of the OS kernel that handles socket communications is in cache contention with
the AES encryption code and that these contentions are the primary source of information
leakage, making the Bernstein’s attack a success.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 introduces the pro-
posed approach; Section 4.2 presents a case study in which we applied the proposed
approach to the Bernstein’s attack; Section 4.3 discusses the current state of the work and
provides ideas for future work; Section 4.4 provides concluding remarks on the chapter.
4.1 Approach
We, in particular, present an approach to detect code segments in cryptographic algo-
rithms, which are in cache contention with each other, thus possibly leaking information
that can be exploited in cache-based side-channel attacks to extract secret keys. This is
important because locating the root causes of information leakage in software implemen-
tation of cryptographic applications provides developers an invaluable opportunity to fix
them, thus prevent side-channel attacks.
In this work we divide a cryptographic application under analysis into a set of non-
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overlapping code blocks.
Definition 1 A code block is a code segment that takes a number of inputs and produces
a number of outputs. Any data, which is not locally defined in a code block, but accessed
from inside the block, is considered to be an input to the code block. Furthermore, any
program state update made inside a code block, which is visible outside the block (includ-
ing the side effects), is considered to be an output of the code block.
In theory, a code block is in cache contention with another code block, when one block
evicts at least one cache line used by the other block. One way to detect contentions is to
use a cache simulator to determine such cache evictions. However, developing cache sim-
ulators is a non-trivial task as one may need to simulate a large portion of the underlying
hardware platform, including the CPU and the RAM. Furthermore, it is often undesirable
(if not infeasible) to execute an application together with its environment, such as the
underlying OS, in a hardware simulator due to the runtime overhead introduced by the
simulator.
We, therefore, developed an approach to empirically (i.e., via conducting experiments)
determine code blocks that are in cache contention with each other. In this approach, to
determine whether a code block A causes cache contentions in another code block B in
program P , we first replace A in P with a mock code block A′. The output is a new
program P ′.
The mock block A′ is constructed by using a simple capture-reply approach. In the
capture mode, the original program P is fed with a set of concrete inputs I , the program
executions are monitored, and the inputs to A together with the respective outputs of A
are captured and recorded. In the reply mode, i.e., in P ′, the mock code block A′ mimics
the behavior of the original code block A by simply replying pre-recorded outputs for the
respective inputs, without performing any actual computations.
We, then, feed P and P ′ with I and measure the number of cache misses experienced
by B in both programs.
Definition 2 In the original program P , the code block A is considered to be in con-
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tention with the code block B, if one can find a set of program inputs I such that the
number of cache misses experienced by B in P ′ is statistically significantly less than that
of experienced by B in P ; computing the same output in A in a different way significantly
reduces the cache misses observed in B.
Note that the same approach can readily be applicable to determine the contentions
between two sets of code blocks.
To count the number of cache misses occurring in a code block, we use hardware
performance counters. One challenge we encountered when first using hardware perfor-
mance counters for this purpose was that the counters do not distinguish between the in-
structions issued by different processes. To deal with this, we used a kernel driver, called
perfctr (http://linux.softpedia.com), which implements virtual hardware counters that
can track hardware events on a per-process basis.
At a high level we count cache misses occurring in a code block as follows: 1) a hard-
ware performance counter that counts L1 data cache misses is activated at the beginning
of a program execution, 2) the value of the counter is read before and after the execution
of the block and the difference is attributed to the block, and 3) the counter is deactivated
at the end of the execution. If the code block is executed more than once, the number of
cache misses are aggregated over all the executions.
4.2 Case Study
We evaluated the proposed approach by conducting a series of experiments. In these
experiments, we applied the approach on the Bernstein’s AES server to determine the
code blocks in the server that cause cache contentions with the AES round tables, thus
making the Bernstein’s attack a success.
An important observation we make in the Bernstein’s attack is that, unlike many other
side channel attacks in which the attack is performed by using a spy process that inten-
tionally creates cache contentions, the Bernstein’s attack operates without using any spy
process. This observation strongly suggests that the cache contentions in the AES server
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are unintentionally caused by some entities in the system.
We distinguish between two types of entities: external entities and internal entities.
External entities are those entities that the AES server has no control over, such as the
CPU architecture of the underlying platform and the other processes sharing the same
hardware and software resources with the AES server. Internal entities, on the other hand,
refer to those entities employed by the AES server, such as the server source code and the
libraries used by the server.
4.2.1 Analyzing External Entities
In our case study, we first evaluated the effects of external entities on the success of cache-
based side-channel attacks. To this end, we conducted a series of experiments, in which
we carried out a slight variation of the Bernstein’s attack, called the last-round Bernstein
attack. This attack variation uses the same AES server and the same AES client as with
the original Bernstein’s attack. The only difference is that the last-round attack targets
the last round of AES, rather than the first round of AES as is the case in the original
Bernstein’s attack.
We conducted the last-round attack on different hardware and software platforms with
varying client-server deployment configurations. In each experiment setup, to carry out
the attack, the malicious AES client used 230 randomly generated messages, each of which
was of size 600 bytes. The AES server, in turn, used the OpenSSL v0.9.7a (Feb 19, 2003)
implementation of AES with a 128-bit secret key, the same implementation used by the
original Bernstein’s attack (http://www.openssl.org/source/), for the encryptions.
Table 4.1 presents the results we obtained. In this table, the first two columns depict
the CPU and the operating system used in the attacks, respectively. The third column
depicts the deployment configuration of the AES client and server, i.e., whether the client
and the server are on the same core or they are on different cores. In the experiment
platforms, each core had its separate L1 data cache.
For each setup, we carried out many experiments. For each key byte, the attack pro-
duced a set of candidate key values, prioritized by their likelihood. The cross product of
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Table 4.1: Results obtained from the last-round Bernstein attack.
AES Client-Server Size of the Reduced
Processor Operating System Deployment Configuration Key Space
Intel Pentium P6200 Ubuntu 3.0.0-12 kernel same core 232
Intel Pentium P6200 Ubuntu 3.0.0-17 kernel different cores 249
Intel Core 2 Duo P8400 Ubuntu 3.0.0-12 kernel same core 1
Intel Core 2 Duo P8400 Ubuntu 3.0.0-17 kernel different cores 224
Intel Xeon E5405 CentOS 2.6.18 kernel same core 234
Intel Xeon E5405 CentOS 2.6.18 kernel different cores 251
the candidate sets for all the key bytes constitutes the reduced key space that needs to be
exhaustively searched for full key extraction.
The last column in Table 4.1 presents the average size of the reduced key spaces
obtained at the end of the attacks. We first observed that the secret key was always in
the reduced key space. We then observed that in all the experiment setup, the size of the
reduced key space was in feasible bounds for an exhaustive search [33].
We, therefore, reached the conclusion that the attack succeeded in extracting the full
key, regardless of the underlying hardware and software platforms, and the client-server
deployment configurations. This result strongly suggests that the unintentional cache
contentions that make the attack a success, are caused primarily internally by the AES
server. We reached this conclusion by noting that varying the external entities did not
render the attack useless.
4.2.2 Analyzing Internal Entities
We then focused on the implementation of the AES server and applied our approach
to identify the code segments in the server source code that can potentially cause the
unintentional cache contentions with the AES round tables.
To perform the analysis, we divided the server code depicted in Algorithm 1 into 3
code blocks, namely RECEIVE, ENCRYPT, and SEND, each containing a single source
code line. Note that the details of the actual server code are abstracted away in Algo-
rithm 1 for the sake of the discussion. However, in the experiments, we used the actual
source code of the Bernstein’s AES server.
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Algorithm 1 AES server
1: while true do
2: Message m← receive()
3: Message c← encrypt(m, key)
4: send(c)
5: end while
Our first goal was to quantify the extent to which each code block suffers from cache
misses. This is important because we use the original AES server code as our control
group and the outcomes obtained from it as the basis for comparison.
To this end, we randomly generated 10, 000 messages for encryption, each of which
is of size 600 bytes. In the experiments, these messages were always used in the same
order for encryption, i.e., in the order they were generated. Furthermore, the first 1, 000
messages were used to warm up the AES server, where no measurements were made. In
the remainder of the chapter, these messages are referred to as the test suite.
We then executed our test suite on the AES server; the AES client sent every message
included in the test suite one after another to the AES server for encryption. All the
experiments reported in this section were carried out on an Intel Xeon E5405 platform
with 4 GB of RAM, running CentOS with kernel v2.6.18. Furthermore, the server and
the client (when present) were executed on two different cores each having its separate
L1 data cache.
For each message received at the server, we counted the number of cache misses
experienced by each of the code blocks. Figure 4.1 visualizes the data we obtained. In
this figure, the horizontal axis denotes the code blocks and the vertical axis denotes the
number of L1 data cache misses observed in the blocks. Furthermore, the total cache
miss counts are itemized to reflect the misses observed in the OS kernel space and in the
user space. Each box in the figure illustrates the distribution of miss counts obtained in
the respective scenario. The lower and upper bar of a box represents the first and third
quartiles and the horizontal bar inside represents the median value.
We observed that RECEIVE and SEND code blocks experienced significantly more
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L1 Data Cache Misses in the Code Blocks
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Figure 4.1: L1 data cache misses in the original AES server [33]
cache misses in the kernel space than in the user space, while ENCRYPTwas experiencing
significantly more misses in the user space than in the kernel space. The average number
of cache misses in RECEIVE, SEND, and ENCRYPT were about 36, 24, and 0.01 in the
kernel space and about 1.7, 0.2, and 24 in the user space, respectively.
As socket communications are mostly handled by the kernel, it is possible for RE-
CEIVE and SEND to have more cache misses in the kernel. Furthermore, as AES encryp-
tion code runs in the user space for the most part, it is possible for ENCRYPT to have
more cache misses in the user space. However, if the cache misses observed in the kernel
space and in the user space are correlated, then it strongly suggests that the kernel is in
contention with the (user space) AES encryption code.
To check for correlations, we first replaced the ENCRYPT code block in the AES
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Algorithm 2 AES server withMOCK ENCRYPT
1: while true do
2: Message m← receive()
3: Message c← mockEncrypt(m, key)
4: send(c)
5: end while
server with aMOCK ENCRYPT block as in Algorithm 2.
Given a message for encryption, MOCK ENCRYPT simply returns the pre-recorded
ciphertext of the message without performing any encryption. The rest of the AES server
code was not changed. We then executed our test suite with the modified AES server, i.e.,
the AES client sent the messages in the test suite one at a time to the server for encryption.
Comparing the Effect of ENCRYPT and MOCK_ENCRYPT
on the Cache Misses Observed in RECEIVE and SEND
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Figure 4.2: Comparing the effect of ENCRYPT and MOCK ENCRYPT on the L1 cache
misses observed in RECEIVE and SEND [33]
Figure 4.2 compares the number of cache misses experienced by the RECEIVE and
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SEND code blocks in the original server and in the modified server. We observed that
using MOCK ENCRYPT reduced the number of L1 data cache misses observed in RE-
CEIVE and SEND by 31% and 63% on average, respectively, compared to that of using
the original code block ENCRYPT. Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that these differences
were statistically significant with a p-value of less than 2.2e-16, suggesting that the AES
encryption code is in contention with the kernel.
In an additional experiment, rather than replacing the code block ENCRYPT with a
mock block, we replaced the RECEIVE and SEND code blocks with their mock blocks,
namely MOCK RECEIVE and MOCK SEND, and kept the original ENCRYPT block as
in Algorithm 3. MOCK RECEIVE simply replays the pre-recorded messages arriving at
the AES server without creating a network socket. Note that the AES client is not used
in this setup, thus no messages are exchanged over the network. As there is no client to
reply to, MOCK SEND does not perform any operation.
Algorithm 3 AES server withMOCK RECEIVE and MOCK SEND
1: while true do
2: Message m← mockReceive()
3: Message c← encrypt(m, key)
4: mockSend(c)
5: end while
Figure 4.3 depicts the results we obtained. We observed that removing the socket
communications reduced the average number of L1 data cache misses observed in the
AES encryption code by 83%. The reduction was statistically significant with a p-value
of less than 2.2e-16.
To validate our results, we carried out the attack, this time without using any network
sockets. To this end, we combined the source code of the AES client and the AES server in
a single stand-alone application and removed all the code segments responsible for socket
communications. That is, the attack code directly called the AES encryption function,
instead of sending and receiving packages over the network. As is the case with the
experiments reported in Section 4.2.1, we used 230 randomly generated messages of 600
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Comparing the Effect of RECEIVE/MOC_RECEIVE and SEND/MOCK_SEND
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Figure 4.3: Comparing the effect of RECEIVE/MOC RECEIVE and SEND/MOCK SEND
on the L1 cache misses observed in ENCRYPT [33]
bytes each in the attack. Furthermore, the attack was repeated 5 times.
At the end of the attacks, the size of the reduced key space was 2107 on average. As it
is not feasible to exhaustively search this space, the attack failed to extract the secret key
in the experiment setup used in the study. For comparison, in the same experiment setup
and with the socket communications are in place, the size of the reduced key space was
251 in the worst case (Table 4.1).
We also observe that, although the attack failed when the socket communications were
removed from the source code, the attack was still be able to reduce the key space from
2128 to 2107. This can point to the presence of other unintentional cache contentions, which
requires further analysis.
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With all these in mind, the results of our experiments strongly suggest that the part of
the OS kernel that handles socket communications is in cache contention with the AES
encryption code and that these contentions are the primary source of information leakage,
making the Bernstein’s attack a success.
4.3 Discussion
In this chapter, we used the proposed approach to determine code segments that are in
cache contention with each other. All empirical studies suffer from threats to their internal
and external validity. One potential threat is that we have only studied one cryptographic
system, namely the Bernstein’s AES server with the OpenSSL implementation of AES.
This may impact the generality of our results. However, this cryptographic system has
been extensively used in other related works in the literature [11,16,22,31,46–55], which
emphasizes the importance and impact of the work. A related issue is that the code blocks
used in the experiments were relatively simple code blocks with well-defined code and
functionality boundaries. While these issues pose no theoretical problems, we need to
apply our approach to larger, more realistic scenarios in future work to understand how
well it scales.
Moreover, the proposed approach can readily be applicable to determine contentions
between code segments on any types of hardware and software resources as long as the
contentions can be quantified. To this end, we believe that using hardware performance
counters is a perfect match as they enable us to quantify contentions on almost all hard-
ware resources, such as CPUs, CPU pipelines, instruction and data caches, branch pre-
diction/target buffers, TLBs, RAMs, memory buses, and I/O buses. Aciicmez et al., for
instance, describe micro-architectural side-channel attacks that exploit contentions on in-
struction cache and branch prediction/target buffers [12,15]. Both attacks rely on the fact
that contentions on these resources, increase the execution time of cryptographic applica-
tions. Although the contentions leveraged in these attacks are intentionally introduced by
a spy process, unintentional contentions on these micro-architectural resources can also
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be exploited in a similar way. We conjecture that the proposed approach can be used to
isolate such unintentional contentions on instruction cache and branch prediction/target
buffers, thus further improve the reliability of cryptographic applications.
Another interesting avenue for future work is to fully automate the proposed approach.
In the experiments, although the mock code blocks were created automatically, we man-
ually decided on the combinations of mock and actual code blocks to be tested. One
challenge towards fully automating the proposed approach is to automatically select the
combinations in such a way that the choice of combinations does not introduce any bias
in the analysis.
A related concern is how best to divide the code base into code blocks. As this division
is application-specific, one way to address this concern is to provide developers with tools
that enable them to annotate the code blocks in programs’ source code. Another way is
to automatically perform the division at a given granularity level, such as at the level of
functions, classes, and libraries, as is the case in performance profiling tools.
4.4 Chapter Summary
Many modern CPUs contain hardware performance counters (HPCs) in their architecture.
These HPCs allow us to count many specific run-time events such as, the number of
instructions executed, the number of branches taken, the number of cache hits and misses.
Even though these counters are mainly purposed to be used in performance profiling, they
can be also used to conduct side channel attacks [24]. In this chapter, we presented a novel
usage of HPCs that allows us to detect the source of information leakage. The proposed
approach is able to detect code segments in cryptographic applications that are in cache
contentions with each other, thus leaking information that can be exploited in cache-based
side-channel attacks to extract secret keys.
In order to evaluate the approach, we conducted a series of experiments by using the
well-known Bernstein’s attack. The results of these experiments helped in pinpointing
the primary source of the exploitable side channel in the Bernstein’s AES server. To be
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more specific, to the best of our knowledge, we demonstrated for the first time, that the
part of the OS kernel that handles socket communications is in cache contention with the
AES encryption code and that these contentions are the primary source of information
leakage, making the Bernstein’s attack a success [33]. In Section 4.2.2, to further validate
our results, we removed the socket communication from the code and observed that the
attack is not feasible anymore.
It is inevitable for a cryptographic processes not to share or to share hardware and
software resources of the underlying platform (i.e. personal computers, workstations, and
servers), on which they run. It is also known that the shared resources may cause an infor-
mation leakage which enables side-channel attacks. Thus, the way the cryptographic pro-
cesses are written requires utmost care and attention to prevent such attacks. We believe
that, the proposed approach can help developers to write more secure programs by pro-
viding them valuable analysis data regarding the possible information leakage sources.
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Chapter 5
REMOVING the PROFILING PHASE
in CACHE-TIMING ATTACKS
In the case of cache attacks, as mentioned in Chapter 2, a profiling phase and/or a spy
process is essential in order to conduct a successful attack. The strength of Bernstein’s
timing attack comes from the fact that it does not require a spy process. As we have shown
in Chapter 4, it depends on the naturally occurring cache contentions between the code
blocks. Albeit it does not need a spy process, a major drawback of Bernstein’s attack is
the necessity of having a computer system which is identical to the target system as the
profiling phase of the attack needs to construct a model of the cache timing-behavior of
the latter. Exact replication of the target system, with running processes on it, with the
same input-output events and all its machine specific cache effects can be very difficult,
which causes the attack to be considered unrealistic in many contexts [16, 21].
In this chapter we propose a methodology, based on hypothetical modeling of the
cache timing-behavior of a computer system and demonstrate that the Bernstein’s attack
successfully recovers the key using one of the models that best represents its cache timing-
behavior. In our hypothetical modeling approach, all possible cache timing-behaviors of
a computer system are analytically extracted and the one that gives the highest correlation
to the measured attack data is chosen to be used in the cache-timing attack. This approach
eliminates the need of a profiling phase (i.e. the need for an identical target machine),
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which makes the attack more realistic and feasible in practice.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 discusses the details of
the profiling phase; Section 5.2 outlines our proposed approach; Section 5.3 explains how
we conduct the Bernstein’s attack without the profiling phase in order to validate our
hypothetical modeling methodology; Section 5.4 discusses the importance and validity of
the results in the context of recent studies; Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.1 Analysis of the Profiling Phase
In Chapter 3, we outline the cache-timing attack of Bernstein briefly and then explain a
modified version of the attack which focuses on the final round, instead of the first round
of AES. Both attacks need a profiling phase. It is now crucial to understand what we
achieve after the profiling phase is successfully applied. In [11] and in Chapter 4 the
sources of the unintentional collisions in cache lines holding the AES lookup tables are
investigated. These unintentional collisions cause variations in access times due to cache
misses. The profiling phase helps to obtain data cache timing-behavior of AES process
by registering the variations in cache line access times. In this section we will further
investigate the profiling phase of the last round attack.
Cache timing-behavior of an AES process can be expressed as a timing model for each
of 16 T4 accesses in the last round. Since we know the secret key in the profiling phase,
the timing model for the ith access in the last round is simply a histogram of the devia-
tion of average execution times of an AES encryption indexed by output bytes of T4 as
computed in Equation 3.1. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 shows such a cache timing-behavior
model where the figures depict the models of bytes 0-7 and bytes 8-15 respectively.
The profiling phase data used in the Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are collected from a com-
puting platform with Intel Pentium P6200 CPU running Ubuntu 3.0.0-12 kernel. In these
figures, the inverse s-box operation is also applied to the models to enhance visual clarity,
hence the x-axis shows the byte indexes (s9i ) used in accesses to table T4.
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Figure 5.1: Example profiling phase cache timing-behavior, bytes 0-7
In Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the mean value is the average execution time of the all encryp-
tion operations. One can notice that the timing measurements are either above or below
the average execution time. Here, the measurements above the average are attributed to
cache misses in the corresponding cache lines due to the extra time required to fetch the
missing data from the main memory. Similarly, the measurements below the average are
attributed to cache hits in the corresponding cache lines.
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Figure 5.2: Example profiling phase cache timing-behavior, bytes 8-15
Furthermore, if all the 16 byte models are examined, it is seen that the execution times
tend to remain above or below the average line for a group of consecutive index values.
This particular pattern can be observed in Figure 5.3 in more detail.
Figure 5.3 just zooms in the models of byte 10 and byte 12 in the Figure 5.2. The
observed pattern is explained by the fact that a cache line holds 16 of the T4 entries; thus
a collision in a cache line will naturally affect the access times of 16 entries due to the
principle of locality.
In Figure 5.3, we also see a symmetry between the two models. They actually suggest
that the same group of consecutive indexes (i.e. cache lines) behave the same way while
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(a) Byte 10 Model
(b) Byte 12 Model
Figure 5.3: Example profiling phase byte 10 and byte 12 model
accessing table T4 (i.e. all hits or all misses). Since these models belong to two different
T4 lookup accesses, it is quite normal to see such a symmetry. An important point to
note here is that the indexes that experience collisions does not change between different
bytes (i.e. always the same indexes cause misses or hits). This observation suggests that
the cache lines which are in contention does not change throughout the execution of the
program. Cache conflicts are consistently occur on the same group of cache lines.
To summarize, at the end of the profiling phase, we obtain a timing model T pi for
44
the ith access in the last round, which is just an array of 256 values where each value
represents the deviation from the average of the total execution times of AES.
In the attack phase, the timing measurements are obtained, grouped and averaged
depending on the values of the ciphertext byte involved in ith output of the T4 lookup
operation, as the corresponding key byte value is unknown. The result is cache timing-
behavior model T˜ ai , which is again an array of 256 values where each value represents
the deviation. Then, the two timing models, namely T pi and T˜
a
i are correlated. As T
p
i is
indexed by T4 output values and T˜ ai by ciphertext byte values, we transform the latter into
256 timing models, T ai,k indexed by the T4 output values by applying an exhaustive search
on the key space of k ∈ [0, 255]. Actual correlations are computed between T pi and T
a
i,k,
and the key values with low correlations are eliminated. The remaining keys, sorted from
highest to lowest correlation, are expected to be few resulting in a significant reduction in
the key space if the attack is successful. The essential steps of the last round attack with
profiling phase are given in Algorithm 4, where T p = ∪15i=0T
p
i and T
a = ∪15i=0T˜
a
i are the
sets of timing models in the profiling and attack phases, respectively.
Algorithm 4 Attack with profiling phase
Require: T p and T a
Ensure: KR: Ordered reduced key space
1: K ← ∅
2: KR ← ∅
3: for i = 0 to 15 do
4: for k = 0 to 255 do
5: T ai,k ← Transform(T˜
a
i , k)
6: γ ← Correlate(T ai,k, T
p
i )
7: ν ← Variance(T ai,k, T
p
i )
8: K[i]← K[i] ∪ (k, γ, ν)
9: end for
10: K[i]← Sort(K[i]) ⊲ Descending on γ
11: δ ← Threshold(K[i])
12: KR[i]← Reduce(K[i], δ)
13: end for
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The last round attack can reveal the entire key, although it still needs a profiling phase.
We already mentioned that it is not an easy task for an attacker to setup an identical
platform and to run the profiling phase. To increase the feasibility and applicability of the
attack, we present a novel methodology which needs neither an identical target system
nor a profiling phase. We use hypothetical modeling to obtain the timing-behavior of the
cache and need only the size of the lookup tables and the cache line size of the computing
platform. The details are provided in the following sections.
5.2 Simplified Cache Timing Model
In this section we introduce a methodology to model the timing characteristics of the data
cache for a running program on a CPU. Highly complex and optimized cache implemen-
tations and lack of details thereof, render an accurate modeling of cache timing-behavior
an involved task. The used models in the cache-timing attack are, in fact, based on the
time variations in the access times of cache lines/sets. Indeed, every memory access re-
sults in accessing a cache line or set whether it is a cache hit or miss. Therefore, a simple
model that is based on variations in cache line/set access times can be used to capture
the cache timing-behavior. The proposed methodology does not aim to capture all the
complicated structural properties of a modern cache. On the contrary, it aims to extract
a generic cache timing-behavior model based on a simplified set of assumptions. The
proposed model requires minimum knowledge (i.e. cache line size) about the target sys-
tem. Although the timing model is obtained using simplified assumptions, it is shown by
our experimental results that it can still be used effectively to conduct successful attacks.
This implies that our simplified model can be extended and improved to cover real-world
computing platforms. Next, we provide a more formal explanation of our model for data
cache timing-behavior:
Definition 3 Data in the data cache of a CPU are composed of individual bytes. Data can
be a complex structure or a simple array. Either way, elements of data are individually
accessible by data indexes. An AES lookup table is an example for data, where an index
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is an 8-bit number.
Assumption 1 Data in the cache are aligned and occupy a number of consecutive cache
lines (unfragmented). The first byte of data is always placed in a new cache line.
Assumption 2 The direct-mapping is used as a cache placement strategy, where a single
cache line can be considered as a cache set. While the exact location of data is unknown
and not needed, relative locations of its elements and the number of cache lines they
occupy can be easily obtained under Assumption 1.
Assumption 3 Parts of data, essentially a sequence of bytes, can be accessed simply by
indexing. Each index value points to an equal number of bytes.
Assumption 4 Data are the relevant part of the code that cause cache hits/misses when
accessed. Accessing data in the cache (i.e. a cache hit) and data not in the cache (i.e. a
cache miss), take t and (t+∆), respectively, and we always have ∆ > 0.
Assumption 5 Cache collisions may occur between two different programs, or within the
same program; i.e. data sharing the same cache lines/sets can evict each other. During
the run of a program, collisions occur always on the same cache lines/sets.
Assumption 6 A cache collision in a cache line evicts the entire block from the cache
and brings a new block from the memory.
Assumption 7 During a single run of a program, data are accessed only once, which
means the program observes only one hit or one miss during the run.
Assumption 8 A program’s execution time varies with its input depending on the cache
hits and misses occurred during its execution. The execution times of a program in the
presence of hits and misses are th and tm, respectively. And th and tm have equal proba-
bility to occur.
Based on these assumptions, we obtain several immediate results, captured as propo-
sitions.
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Proposition 1 Following Assumption 1 and Assumption 3, the total number of cache lines
occupied by data can be calculated as
n =
⌈
|data|
b
⌉
, (5.1)
where |data| and b stand for the number of bytes in data and in a cache line, respectively.
Proposition 2 Following Assumptions 4, 7 and 8, we can approximate th, tm and ta of a
program with
th = t+ tf , (5.2)
tm = (t+∆) + tf , (5.3)
ta = (th + tm)/2, (5.4)
where ta is the average execution time of a program, tf is the execution time of instructions
that do not require memory access. As ∆ > 0, we have th < ta < tm. This result implies
that a particular execution time of a program will tend to be higher than the average
execution time of that program (ta) , when the program accesses the cache lines that are
subject to collisions, and vice versa.
Proposition 3 Let the cache line index range [c1, c2], where c2 > c1 and c1, c2 ≥ 0,
represent the indexes where cache lines are in collision. Taking the Assumptions 2, 5,
and 6 into account, we can calculate the range of data indexes which maps to the colliding
cache lines. Let κ denotes the number of bytes accessed by each data index. Then, all data
indexes within the following range are mapped to the cache lines which are in collision:
Ic =
[
c1 · b
κ
,
c2 · b
κ
+
b
κ
− 1
]
. (5.5)
Here, the cache line and data indexes starts from 0 (i.e. first b bytes of the data reside in
the 0th cache line, second b bytes reside in the 1st cache line, etc.).
Based on these assumptions and propositions, an algorithm can be given to extract a
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timing model of the cache memory. Algorithm 5 describes the steps to obtain a model for
a given data.
Algorithm 5Modeling the cache timing-behavior
Require: data,m, Sc, b, κ
Ensure: T : Cache timing-behavior model
1: Ic = MissDataIndex(Sc, b, κ) ⊲ (Proposition 3)
2: for s = 0 tom− 1 do ⊲ for each data index
3: if s ∈ Ic then
4: T [s] = 1
5: else
6: T [s] = −1
7: end if
8: end for
In Algorithm 5, m is the number of indexes that are used to access data parts of κ
bytes, b is the number of bytes in one cache line, and Sc denotes the subset of cache lines
subject to collisions (i.e. contention set). The algorithm returns a timing model T , where
each value of the index used to access data is matched with a timing value. Line 1 of
Algorithm 5 calculates the set of data indexes which results in cache misses and Line 3
of Algorithm 5 checks whether a data index is in set Ic. In the case the referenced index
causes a miss, the access to the corresponding data part will take longer. In this model we
assume ta = 0, th = −1 and tm = 1 for simplicity.
Example 1 Suppose that data is an array of 80 bytes and each data index points to 2
bytes in the memory. If the cache block size is b = 8, then data will use m = 40 indexes
and fits in 10 cache lines. Further assume that cache line indexes [2, 3] and [6, 8] are in
the contention set. Then using Preposition 3, we can find which data indexes will cause
a cache miss. If we use Algorithm 5, our model will have a total of 40 indexes and the
indexes in ranges [8, 15] and [24, 35] will have the value of 1, while the rest of the indexes
will have the value of −1 as illustrated in Figure 5.4.
When Figures 5.3 and 5.4 are compared, one can easily see the similarity between
the patterns in the execution times in the actual and the simplified timing models. In the
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Figure 5.4: Example cache timing-behavior model
timing models obtained in the profiling phase of the Bernstein’s attack, table T4 is data
and lookup bytes are the indexes as defined by the terminology introduced in Section 5.2.
The measured timing values in the profiling phase of the Bernstein’s attack are noisy
and obtained by averaging excessively many AES execution times. All the same, the
simplified timing model captures essentially the same behavior.
5.3 Practical Application of The Proposed Methodology
and Validation Results
In this section, we give a formal description of the non-profiled Bernstein attack, which
we use to validate our hypothetical modeling methodology and present our experimental
results.
5.3.1 Cache Timing Attacks without a Profiling Phase
In order for an attacker to model the cache timing-behavior of the server in the profiling
phase, the attacker must produce an identical system the cache timing-behavior of which
must exactly be the same as the target computer. Exact replication of the target system,
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with running processes on it, with the same input output events and all its machine specific
cache effects can be very difficult, if not impossible. This is a major drawback in the
Bernstein’s original cache-timing attack, which is also mentioned in [21] and [16]. Using
hypothetical modeling as suggested here, however, eliminates the need for an identical
system, hence the profiling phase. The attack without the profiling phase needs only
the knowledge of the cache line size of the target computer and the size of the lookup
tables. A typical cache line size is 64 B in majority of contemporary computers and the
AES lookup tables and their sizes can be obtained by examining the source code of the
implementation.
Since we perform the last round attack, the data is table T4 of 1024 B, which is used
only in the last round of AES encryption. It has 256 indexes and each index is used
to access a 4 B entry. As all our target platforms have cache line sizes of 64 B, table T4
occupies 16 cache lines. The correct timing model of the cache can be obtained only if we
know the cache lines subject to eviction due to collisions. However, without an identical
computer system on which AES runs with a known key, we infer no information about
the contention set and therefore the cache timing-behavior cannot be obtained. On the
other hand, in our simplified approach, we have only a total of 216 simplified models as
T4 occupies 16 cache lines. Thus, a brute-force approach, based on trying all simplified
models exhaustively, is feasible.
To form our simplified models we need to find the cache contention sets. As there are
216 simplified models (i.e. 216 cache configurations of hits and misses), we can use 16-bit
integers that take values in [0, 216 − 1] to represent these models. For instance, the index
value of 0x7FFF in hexadecimal representation indicates that the first cache line is in the
contention set assuming that each bit of an index stands for a cache line and the bit value
of 0 indicates a collision in the corresponding cache line. Algorithm 6 explains how the
cache contention sets are derived. It takes an index and iterates through its bits starting
from the rightmost bit, which corresponds to the last cache line.
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Algorithm 6 Obtaining a cache contention set
Require:
l : index of simplified cache timing model
n : number of cache lines occupied by data
Ensure: SC : Cache contention set for index l
1: SC ← ∅
2: for i = n− 1 to 0 do
3: if (l mod 2 == 0) then
4: SC ← SC ∪ i
5: end if
6: l ← l/2
7: end for
Finally, Algorithm 7 gives us the most possible cache timing-behavior model given
the timing measurement data from the attack phase (i.e. T a).
Algorithm 7 iterates through all simplified cache timing models; it first finds the cor-
responding contention set in line 3, then calculates the corresponding simplified model in
line 5, and applies the AES s-box operation on the model in lines 6-10 since we perform
the last round attack using the outputs of table T4. Then the attack phase in Algorithm 4
is applied to find the size of the reduced key space in line 12. The sizes of the reduced key
space for simplified models are saved as described in line 13. Finally, they are sorted from
smallest to largest (line 15) and the simplified model with the smallest reduced key space
size is chosen as the most probable cache timing-behavior model (line 16). As the Bern-
stein attack tends to calculate higher correlation values for the simplified models which
are closer to the measurements in the attack phase, and higher correlations yield smaller
reduced key space sizes, we propose to select the model with the smallest reduced key
space. Once we obtain the model, we can run Algorithm 4 and find the key bytes.
In order to test Algorithm 7, we ran it for the example data set in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and
5.3 and obtained the index 14433 as the most probable cache timing model. When we plot
this model, we obtain Figure 5.5. A closer look at Figure 5.5 reveals that our simplified
model (Figure 5.5b) resembles to the real model (Figure 5.5a) previously depicted in
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Algorithm 7 Searching for cache timing-behavior model
Require:
T4 : Lookup table
m : Index count of T4
κ : Size of each T4 entry in number of bytes
b : Size of each cache line in number of bytes
T a : Timing model in attack phase
n : Number of cache lines occupied by T4
δ : Correlation threshold
Ensure: T˜ h: Correct cache timing-behavior model
1: M← ∅
2: for l = 0 to 2n − 1 do
3: SC ← Algorithm 6(l, n)
4: for j = 0 to 15 do
5: T hl [j][:]← Algorithm 5(T4,m,SC , b, κ)
6: for i = 0 to 255 do
7: x← AES-sbox(i)
8: T htmp[j][x]← T
h
l [j][i]
9: end for
10: T hl [j][:]← T
h
tmp[j][:]
11: end for
12: KR ← Algorithm 4(T
h
l , T
a)
13: M←M∪ (T hl , |KR|)
14: end for
15: M← Sort(M) ⊲ Ascending on |KR|
16: T˜ h ←M[0][0]
Figure 5.3b.
An important point to note here is that, in Algorithm 7, we assume that all the lookup
index bytes will have the same timing model. Actually this is not always the case. In
Section 5.1 we mention that a cache timing model actually gives us the cache lines which
are in contention, thus a model can take two forms as seen in Figure 5.3. Thus, for the
indexes used in lookup operations where the real model is the symmetric of our simplified
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(a) Measured model (Figure 5.3b)
(b) Calculated model
Figure 5.5: Calculated profiling phase model vs. measured profiling phase model
model, the correct key value will tend to appear in the bottom of the sorted list of reduced
key spaces. The problem can be solved with a small modification in Algorithm 4. In
Algorithm 4, key guesses are sorted depending on their correlation values, which can
be positive or negative. The key value with the maximum correlation becomes the most
possible candidate. In case of a symmetry between the real and the simplified model, this
correlation grows in the negative direction for the correct key guesses. Thus, if we take
the absolute values of the correlations before sorting, the correct key byte will appear in
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the first ranks in the sorted list.
5.3.2 Experimental Results
We used the same data set used in Chapter 4 for our experiments. It is important to
remind that, we executed the last round attack with and without a profiling phase on
various software and hardware setups with different client-server deployment configura-
tions. Each attack is conducted by the AES client with 230 randomly generated messages,
where the size of each message is 600 B. The target of the attack, the AES server, runs the
table-based OpenSSL (v0.9.7a) implementation of AES, which is employed originally by
Bernstein in his attack, to encrypt the incoming messages. In the attacks with a profiling
phase, two separate measurements are used (i.e. profiling and attack phase measurements)
while in the attacks without a profiling phase only attack phase measurements are used.
The attacks generated a candidate set for each key byte value, which are sorted by their
likelihood. By multiplying the sizes of the candidate sets we obtain the reduced key space
size for the whole AES key, which necessitated exhaustive search.
For each attack setup, we conducted a number of attacks and calculated the average of
the results. In the Table 5.1 we prefer to list only the average values after we conducted
a number of attacks for each case as enumerating the results of each attack individually
would result in a table which is difficult to interpret. Furthermore, in some of our setups,
we observed large discrepancies between the best and worst case results, which we think
would misguide the reader. In the first three columns of the Table 5.1, the attack configu-
rations (i.e. the CPU type, operating system and the client-server deployment setup) are
given. The fourth and fifth columns present the average sizes of the reduced key spaces
obtained after the last round attack with a profiling phase and without a profiling phase,
respectively.
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Table 5.1: Attack results without profiling phase
Operating AES Client-Server Reduced Key Space Reduced Key Space
Processor System Deployment Configuration with a Profiling Phase without a Profiling Phase
Intel Pentium P6200 Ubuntu 3.0.0-12 kernel same core 232 232
Intel Pentium P6200 Ubuntu 3.0.0-17 kernel different cores 249 237
Intel Core 2 Duo P8400 Ubuntu 3.0.0-12 kernel same core 1 212
Intel Core 2 Duo P8400 Ubuntu 3.0.0-17 kernel different cores 224 229
Intel Xeon E5405 CentOS 2.6.18 kernel same core 234 219
Intel Xeon E5405 CentOS 2.6.18 kernel different cores 251 216
5
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In our experiments, we always found the unknown AES key in the reduced key space.
We also observed that for all of the attack configurations the sizes of the reduced key
spaces were always within feasible limits for an exhaustive search. An in-depth analy-
sis of the results further reveals that the attack performed better in the majority of the
cases when the client and server were located in the same core. Since cache collisions are
caused by the program itself and by other programs sharing the same cache lines, when
the two programs reside in the same core, more cache collisions occur and the attack per-
forms better. The results also show that the performance of the proposed attack without
a profiling phase is comparable to that of the original attack. We further observed perfor-
mance gains in some of the cases, specifically in rows 2, 5, and 6. If we check the sizes of
the “reduced key space with a profiling phase” in these rows, we see that they are larger
compared to the rest of the results. This implies that the profiling and/or attack phase
measurements are noisy and this situation degrades the performance of the attack with a
profiling phase. However, when we apply our proposed approach on these cases, we ob-
serve a performance gain. This gain is possibly due to the fact that our simplified models
are noise free and specifically selected for the attack phase data. Thus, we can claim that
our proposed methodology gives better results under noisy conditions. Our results show
that performance of the proposed attack varies in the experiment setups (i.e. it increases,
decreases and stays same in comparison with the attack with profiling phase). We should
note that no correlations are observed between these test setups. The performance of the
attack depends solely on the configuration of underlying software and hardware platform
during execution of the attack.
Furthermore, we also tried a more realistic setup where we measured the execution
timings from the client side. In this setup we used a PC which hosts two separate In-
tel Xeon E5405 CPUs, where AES server and client run on separate CPUs. Since both
programs run on the same PC, we minimize the effects of network delay on the measure-
ments. In the classical attack (i.e. using both profiling and attack phases) we reduced
the key space to 267 from 2128 with 234 measurements, while the non-profiled attack re-
duced the key space to 260 with 234 measurements. These results demonstrate that our
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methodology can also be used in multi-processor and multi-core platforms. This finding
is especially important in cloud computing environments as different virtual machines can
be co-located in different cores of the same computer.
5.4 Discussion
In this chapter we experimentally showed that it is possible to conduct successful cache-
timing attacks with the proposed simplified model. On the other hand, how such success-
ful results are achieved with this simplified model may not be obvious. If the assumptions
captured all the structural properties of a cache (which is most probably not possible), our
model could mimic exactly the same behavior of a cache and we would possibly need
fewer number of measurements to conduct a successful attack. However, in our experi-
ments without a profiling phase, we used 230 measurements, which is the same number
that we used in the attack with a profiling phase. This high number of measurements is
required in order to compensate for the unknown architectural and behavioral complexi-
ties of cache memory hierarchy, which cannot be fully captured by our simplified set of
assumptions. For example, in Assumption 2, what would happen if we assumed the cache
were 4-way set associative? There would not be any cache evictions in a related AES
table until the relevant cache line in the set were accessed by the process. However, the
experiments show that cache evictions eventually occur. Thus, we would just need to wait
until a cache eviction occurs, which means taking more measurements. Consequently,
we compensate for the deficiencies due to the simplifications of the cache behavior by
increasing the measurement count and using statistical techniques.
A further improvement introduced by this new method is that it does not need the
modification of the address space layout randomization (ASLR) flag as mentioned in [33].
The ASLR technique randomizes the address space of the executables, stack, heap, and
the libraries. Since the original Bernstein’s attack needs two separate runs (i.e. profiling
and attack phase), the address spaces may be different at each run due to ASLR. Thus, the
timing models of these two phases may not correlate and the attack may fail. However, in
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our methodology there is no need for a separate profiling phase that may cause a mismatch
between profiling and attack phase timing models. Consequently, this result demonstrates
that the use of ASLR is not an effective countermeasure against the cache attack.
The applicability of the proposed attack on CPUs that are from different vendors is
an important topic that needs further investigation, but during our research we did not
have the opportunity to conduct the attack on CPUs from different vendors. Nevertheless,
in modern CPUs cache architectures share common characteristics, such as multilevel
cache hierarchies and moving of data in blocks in case of cache conflicts. Furthermore,
in [46, 47], the authors implement Bernstein’s attack on ARM CPU and, in [31, 48–50],
the authors successfully apply known cache attacks on embedded ARM CPU platforms.
We think that these publications and the similarities of the modern cache architectures
provide strong evidence that our attack would also work on different CPU platforms.
It may be argued that the table-based AES implementation is outdated and many im-
provements, such as AES-New Instructions (NI) support and side-channel resistant imple-
mentations have been added to the OpenSSL library since then. Nevertheless, we think,
as many others in the scientific community, that vulnerabilities enabling cache attacks are
important artifacts that require further study. Therefore, in this study we investigated the
feasibility of an improved attack based on a generalized cache timing-behavior modeling
approach, and in order to verify our claims we used this specific implementation as a test
bed since it is easier to observe leakages, which simplifies the verification process. In
addition, there have been many recent works based on this table-based AES implemen-
tation. In [46, 47], Spreitzer et al. perform Bernstein’s cache-timing attack on modern
ARM CPU architectures, demonstrating that it is possible to perform this attack on ARM
architectures. In [31, 48–50], several authors conduct other known cache attacks such
as prime+probe, flush+reload, evict+reload, flush+flush, cache access pattern, and cache
collision attacks, which show these attacks are also applicable on embedded platforms.
In [51, 52], Gulmezoglu et al. conduct successful flush+reload and prime+probe cache
attacks on cross-virtual machine (VM) environments. In [55], Irazoqui et al. show it is
possible to successfully conduct Bernstein’s cache-timing attack on Xen and VMware by
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using popular crypto libraries. Again Irazoqui et al. show in [53, 54] that it is possi-
ble to perform flush+reload and prime+probe cache attacks on virtualized environments.
In [56], Weiß et al. perform Bernstein’s cache-timing attack on a virtualization environ-
ment, which runs on an ARM CPU platform. In a recent research that claims a novel
attack [57], the stalling delay caused by cache bank conflicts is exploited to infer the se-
cret key. In [58], Moghimi et al. conduct a cache attack on a Software Guard eXtensions
(SGX) [59] supported Intel platform with different AES implementations. In [60], the au-
thors provide improvements over existing cache attacks and provide experimental results.
In [61], the authors show a cross processor cache attack that targets high efficiency CPU
interconnects. Moreover, in [23, 62], the authors share their findings on cache attacks ex-
perimented on general purpose CPUs. All of the works mentioned above share a common
point, which is that they all use the same or similar table-based AES implementations.
5.5 Chapter Summary
Bernstein’s cache-timing attack has been widely studied in the literature. The reason
behind its attraction is that the attack does not need a spy process like the other cache-
timing attacks. However, the attack still has a major drawback: It needs a profiling phase
where an identical target system is a necessity. In this chapter, we provide a solution
to this problem. We present a methodology to extract a simplified model of the cache
timing-behavior of a computer, which eliminates the need for a profiling phase [35].
In the presented methodology, the cache is partitioned into two sets of cache lines: the
cache lines in one set take longer to access due to persistent collisions and those in the
other that are faster to access as the collisions in them are absent, few or sporadic. The
simplified model can be extracted with two easily obtainable information: Cache-line size
and the size of the sensitive data that causes cache conflicts.
Furthermore, we also present a variant of Bernstein’s cache-timing attack without
a profiling phase on the last round of AES and demonstrate that it can be successfully
applied in many experimental settings. The implementation results demonstrate that the
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method can be used to extract realistic timing models and the non-profiled attack has a
comparable performance to the original attack with a profiling phase.
The proposed methodology can also be applied on other CPU architectures and on
other cryptographic algorithms, as long as cache conflicts (e.g. cache misses) occur on
sensitive data (e.g. AES lookup tables), which leaks information about the secret key.
In summary, the new method allows to apply Bernstein’s attack in a more realistic and
practical context by eliminating the profiling phase and its associated difficulties.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS and FUTUREWORK
Throughout the history, sharing of sensitive information securely has been of great impor-
tance for human beings, governments, armies and corporations, etc. People developed a
multitude of methods to hide the secret information from their adversaries. These efforts
gave rise to the science of cryptography. Many mathematical algorithms were developed
to encrypt sensitive information. And these algorithms were mathematically analyzed to
be proven secure. However, side channel analysis changed the game. It showed that math-
ematical robustness is not enough. To be truly secure, cryptographic algorithms should
also be implemented securely. Bernstein’s cache-timing attack is one of the most studied
side channel attacks, which uses the timing information as a side channel. Bernstein’s
attack drew a great amount of attention, due to the fact that it does not need a spy process
to create cache conflicts. The attack works thanks to some internal cache conflicts within
a program. There are studies which showed that the L1 data cache conflicts allow the
Bernstein’s attack to be successful, even though there has not been a study in the litera-
ture to provide an in-depth analysis to find out the main source of the information leakage.
Moreover, the attack had one drawback, that it needs an identical target machine to per-
form its profiling phase. This requirement caused the attack to be considered unrealistic.
In this dissertation we provide solutions to these problems.
To address the former problem, we propose to use hardware performance counters
to quantify the cache misses as a result of cache conflicts within the code blocks in a
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program. The proposed approach divides the program into code blocks. Just before the
beginning and right after the end of each code block, L1 data cache miss counter is read.
The difference of the two values gives the number of cache misses that the code block
observed. Then, a code block (e.g. B) is replaced with its mockup counterpart (e.g. B
′
)
to see the code block’s effect on the other code blocks. If the other code blocks observe
fewer number of misses when B
′
is in the program, then we deduce that B causes cache
conflicts on the other code blocks. By using our proposed approach, we showed that
the socket communication code blocks cause cache conflicts on the AES encryption code
block. In order to further validate our approach, we removed the socket communication
from the program and conducted Bernstein’s attack. In the end, we could not get any
meaningful results from the attack, which is due to the removal of the contention sources.
We believe that the proposed approach can be used by the developers to produce more
robust implementations for the cryptographic algorithms.
Secondly, we propose a methodology to eliminate the requirement of the profiling
phase in Bernstein’s attack. In our methodology we propose to use simplified cache
timing-behavior models instead of a profiling phase. The simplified models can be con-
structed using few generic and easily obtainable information about the target system such
as cache line size. Furthermore, we used the simplified models in order to conduct the
Bernstein’s attack without a profiling phase. The improved attack, exhaustively tries all
the possible simplified models and choses the best one to use in the attack. Experimental
results showed that the attack without the profiling phase has comparable performance to
the original attack with the profiling phase. By removing the profiling phase of the Bern-
stein’s attack, we are able to demonstrate that the attack can be applied in a more realistic
setting increasing its importance.
6.1 Future Directions
The experiments which we performed for isolating the leakage sources were conducted
on relatively simple code blocks. This work can be extended to more complex programs
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to evaluate the approach on real life scenarios. Moreover, automating the code block
selection at a predefined granularity level would be an interesting topic to study. We
believe that the proposed methodology is a valuable tool to detect code blocks which are
in contention with cryptographic code blocks handling secret information. It, therefore,
can be used as a part of a secure software generation toolset in order to analyze the critical
code blocks against possible information leaks.
The improved cache-timing attack was experimented on general purpose CPUs. As
future study, this work can be extended on embedded platforms as well as multi-tenant
cloud computing environments. Moreover, evaluating the applicability of the improved
attack on other table-based cryptographic algorithms would be an other interesting topic
to study. Our improvements on the Bernstein’s attack made it easily applicable for real
life systems. Thus, apart from attacking cryptographic systems, the improved attack can
be used to investigate possible vulnerabilities of cryptographic systems. And depending
on the assessment results, administrators of such systems can take required actions.
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